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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this bankruptcy-related appeal, we consider the 
validity of a provision in Continental Airlines' plan of 
reorganization that released and permanently enjoined 
shareholder lawsuits against certain of Continental Airlines' 
present and former directors and officers who were not 
themselves in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court made no 
specific findings regarding its jurisdiction, substantive legal 
authority, or factual basis to justify this provision. The 
District Court nonetheless upheld the provision. We will 
reject Continental Airlines' contention that claim preclusion 
and the doctrine of equitable mootness prevent us from 
considering the merits of this appeal. We will reverse the 
District Court's order approving the validity of this 




Appellants are plaintiffs in several securities fraud class 
action lawsuits brought against directors and officers of 
Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc. Plaintiffs' class actions 
allege that the D&O defendants caused Continental Airlines 
Holdings to issue false and misleading statements of 
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material facts in violation of, inter alia, section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, and common 
law. On December 3, 1990, Continental Holdings and 
affiliated entities ("Continental Debtors") filed petitions for 
relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 
District of Delaware.1 
 
The nature of this appeal requires that we provide a 
detailed summary of the chain of events in the bankruptcy 
case. The Continental Debtors brought an adversary 
proceeding on January 17, 1991 to prevent Plaintiffs' class 
actions against the non-debtor D&O defendants from 
interfering with the Continental Debtors' reorganization 
process. The Bankruptcy Court temporarily enjoined 
Plaintiffs' pursuit of their class actions on February 2, 
1991. That order was affirmed on appeal on June 28, 1993. 
See In re Continental Airlines, 177 B.R. 475 (D. Del. 1993). 
The District Court decision noted that the injunction could 
have been more narrowly crafted to permit some portion of 
Plaintiffs' class actions to continue, but Plaintiffs did not 
avail themselves of the opportunity to participate in the 
drafting of the Bankruptcy Court order. Id. at 482. 
Plaintiffs' class actions remained pending, but inactive, 
during the reorganization proceedings. 
 
On December 1, 1992, the Bankruptcy Court approved a 
settlement between the Continental Debtors, their D&Os, 
and D&O liability insurers. See Supp. App. B33, B43. 
Under this Tripartite Settlement, "The Debtors, Insureds 
and the Insurers will provide releases to each other." Supp. 
App. 36. The Continental Debtors released "any and all 
claims, demands, and causes of action of any kind . . . 
against the present or former officers or directors of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Continental Debtors are not named defendants in Plaintiffs' class 
actions. Some Plaintiffs nonetheless filed a class "proof of claim" on the 
basis of their class action complaints in the Continental Airlines 
Holdings bankruptcy case. The proof of claim states that the amount of 
the claim is "unspecified, but in excess of several million dollars." 
Joint 
 
App. A528 - A530. A memorandum supplementing the proof of claim 
form states that "[t]he debtors were, at the time of the filing of the 
petition initiating this case, and are still liable to the claimants and 
the 
class, in a sum not presently determinable, but believed to exceed 
$5,000,000." Id. 
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Continental Debtors . . . which arose prior to the date of 
this settlement and release." Supp. App. B47. The D&O 
liability insurers were released from "any and all demands, 
claims, and causes of action . . . that they or any of them 
had, now have, or may have against the Insurers" in 
exchange for providing $5 million to the Continental 
Debtors to settle the Continental Debtors' claims and 
potential claims against their D&Os. Supp. App. B57 - B58. 
In turn, the D&Os released their claims against the 
Continental Debtors. Supp. App. 63-64. The Tripartite 
Settlement was binding "upon the signatories hereto and all 
other insured persons and entities under the Policies, and 
their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and estates." 
Supp. App. B60. This Tripartite Settlement makes no 
reference to Plaintiffs' class actions, and Plaintiffs did not 
object to the settlement or appeal the order approving the 
settlement. 
 
The Continental Debtors later filed a plan of 
reorganization, amended several times, which contained a 
provision releasing and permanently enjoining a broader 
range of claims, including Plaintiffs' class actions against 
the non-debtor D&O defendants: 
 
       12.4 Release of Certain Claims and Actions 
 
       (a) On the Effective Date, in order to further the 
       rehabilitation of the Debtors, any and all claims and 
       causes of action, now existing or hereafter arising, 
       against any present or former officer or director  of any 
       of the Debtors or any of the Debtors' professional 
       advisors arising out of or related to such Person's 
       actions or omissions to act in his or her capacity as an 
       officer or director of the Debtors or as a member of any 
       committee, or as a fiduciary of any pension or 
       employee benefit plan, or as such an advisor, relating 
       to the Debtors at any time through the Confirmation 
       Date, are irrevocably waived, released and 
       relinquished, and each of the Debtors, its Creditors, 
       and Equity Holders and all other persons is enjoined 
       from asserting any such claim or cause of action in any 
       court or forum. . . . 
 
       (b)(ii) Various claims, including the Stockhol der Actions, 
       also have been asserted or threatened against certain 
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       present or former directors of the Debtors including 
       claims arising out of intercompany transactions that 
       occurred and decisions that were made prior to 
       December 3, 1990 . . . The Debtors have maintained a 
       directors and officers liability insurance policy and the 
       insurer under such policy, following approval by the 
       Bankruptcy Court on December 1, 1992, paid $5 
       million in final settlement in final settlement of all 
       claims (excepting only the L/S Claims). The 
       Confirmation Order shall . . . . provide that all Persons 
       shall thenceforth be permanently enjoined, stayed and 
       restrained from pursuing or prosecuting any such 
       actions against any person so released. 
 
Joint App. A247 - A248 (emphasis added). According to the 
Continental Debtors, subsection (b)(ii) applies to Plaintiffs 
because their actions fall within the definition of 
"stockholder actions" under S 1.168 of the plan. See Brief 
for Appellees at 11, n4. 
 
Plaintiffs filed detailed objections to section 12.4 on at 
least five occasions. Plaintiffs in the consolidated class 
actions filed objections on December 30, 1992 and 
February 17, 1993. Joint App. A354, A505. Plaintiffs in the 
Gillman class action filed objections on December 30, 1992 
and February 17, 1993. Joint App. A373, A523. Plaintiffs 
also filed a letter brief reply on April 12, 1993. Joint App. 
A467. In these objections, Plaintiffs complained that the 
plan impermissibly "purports to release all claims held by 
the Class against certain third party non-debtors who are 
not before this court. . . . The releases will not be voluntary. 
. . . The plan seeks to effectively discharge obligations of 
non-debtors over the objections of creditors." Joint App. 
A511-A512. In response to Plaintiffs' objections, the 
Continental Debtors stated that Plaintiffs' objection: 
 
       [R]elates only to Section 12(b)(ii) of the Plan . . . Section 
       12(b)(ii) is entirely historical in nature and refers only 
       to certain already-settled derivative litigation which was 
       property of the Debtors' estates. All of the litigation 
       referred to in Section 12.4(b)(ii) and in Objection No. 6 
       was settled under a settlement agreement approved by 
       this Court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 on 
       December 1, 1992. These objectors did not object to 
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       this Court's order approving that settlement, nor did 
       they appeal therefrom. The order has long since 
       become final and the settlement payment of $5 million 
       has been made. These objectors have slept on their 
       right to object to the Settlement; their complaint about 
       the proposed Order is moot. 
 
Joint App. A484. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court overruled Plaintiffs' objections to 
the Continental Debtors' disclosure statement because no 
one was present to prosecute them. See Supp. App. B364 
- B365.2 Plaintiffs' objections to the Continental Debtors' 
plan of reorganization itself were not addressed at the plan 
confirmation hearing. Plaintiffs' counsel did not respond 
when the Bankruptcy Court announced Plaintiffs' 
opportunity to present their objections, matters no. 24 and 
25, at the plan confirmation hearing on April 7, 1993. See 
Third Supp. App. B1625 (Bankruptcy Court calling Freberg 
and Gillman objections, with no response, and continuing 
onward). In Plaintiffs' April 9, 1993 letter-brief reply, 
Plaintiffs notified the Bankruptcy Court and the 
Continental Debtors that "Class Plaintiffs submit this letter- 
brief reply to the Debtors' brief in support of the Plan 
because they may not be able to personally attend the 
confirmation hearing on the date and time that the Class 
Plaintiffs' objections are called for oral argument." Joint 
App. A467, fn1. The Bankruptcy Court approved 
Continental Debtors' plan of reorganization on April 16, 
1993. Plaintiffs filed an appeal on June 28, 1993 seeking a 
reversal of the order confirming the Continental Debtors' 
plan. Plaintiffs did not seek a stay of the confirmation order 
pending appeal. 
 
More than five years later, on September 30, 1998, the 
District Court issued a memorandum opinion and order 
affirming the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order. In 
upholding the validity of the release and permanent 
injunction of Plaintiffs' claims against the non-debtor D&O 
defendants, the District Court first assessed the relevance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A disclosure statement must be filed, approved, and circulated in 
connection with a plan of reorganization to provide adequate information 
regarding the effects of a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. S 1125. 
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of 11 U.S.C. S 524(e), which states generally that a 
discharge of a debtor's obligations in bankruptcy does not 
relieve non-debtor parties of liability for debts. The District 
Court declined to adopt a per se rule that section 524(e) 
prohibits non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions 
due to the District Court's belief that such a rule would be 
inconsistent with bankruptcy courts' broad equitable 
powers. The District Court next noted that several courts 
have relied on 11 U.S.C. S 105(a) in upholding the validity 
of non-consensual releases and permanent injunctions that 
are essential to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 
Section 105(a) authorizes courts to take actions"necessary 
or appropriate" to carry out the provisions of Title 11 of the 
United States Code. 
 
Although the District Court acknowledged that 
involuntary releases of non-debtor parties are regarded with 
disfavor in general, the District Court also stated that a 
confirmed and implemented plan of reorganization should 
be disturbed for only "compelling reasons" and found no 
compelling reason to modify the Continental Debtors' plan 
based on the Plaintiffs' objections. The District Court 
reasoned that the Plaintiffs did not object to or appeal the 
Tripartite Settlement, which the Court perceived as the 
operative document governing Plaintiffs' rights. At the same 
time, the District Court considered the release and 
permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' lawsuits to be a"key 
element" of the Continental Debtors' reorganization because 
the Continental Debtors were obliged to indemnify the 
D&Os, and thus Plaintiffs' lawsuits ultimately would 
diminish the funds available for the Continental Debtors' 
creditors and would burden the reorganized Continental 
Debtors with litigation. The District Court did not refer to 
any factual evidence in the record to support its conclusion 
that the release and permanent injunction were key to the 
Continental Debtors' reorganization or that the Continental 
Debtors would be unduly burdened. Rather, the District 
Court presumed that the reorganized Continental Debtors 
and their management would be distracted post- 
confirmation by discovery and litigation. The District Court 
also based its affirmance on its view that Plaintiffs' lawsuits 
would implicate the Continental Debtors' D&O liability 
insurance policy, and thus affected property of the 
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Continental Debtors' bankruptcy estate. On October 30, 





Our jurisdiction to review this appeal is based on 28 
U.S.C. SS 158(d) and 1291. We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court's decision to affirm the Bankruptcy 
Court's order. See Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Trans 
World Airlines (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 
124, 130 (3d Cir. 1998). We use the same standards to 
review the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order as did 
the District Court; we therefore "review the Bankruptcy 
Court's legal determinations de novo, its factualfindings for 
clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse 
thereof." Manus Corp. v. NRG Energy, Inc. (In re O'Brien 
Environmental Energy, Inc.), 188 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing Interface Group-Nevada, 145 F.3d at 131). 
 
The Continental Debtors contend that we should not 
address the merits of Plaintiffs' claim because of claim 
preclusion and equitable mootness. We first will address, 




The Continental Debtors argue that Plaintiffs' objections 
to the plan are precluded by virtue of Plaintiffs' failure to 
object to the Tripartite Settlement. Claim preclusion 
requires a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
involving the same parties, or their privities, and a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. See 
CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 
194 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Board of Trustees of Trucking 
Employees Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 
(3d Cir. 1992)); Sanders Confectionary Products, Inc., v. 
Heller Financial, Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992). 
Claim preclusion commonly occurs when a party fails to 
raise issues in the plan confirmation process that could 
have been addressed in that forum, or fails to appeal the 
confirmation order; in such instances, a collateral attack on 
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the validity of a provision of that plan, such as a non- 
debtor release or injunction, often has been unsuccessful.3 
 
In the instant appeal, the Continental Debtors do not 
contend that we should bar Plaintiffs' appeal for failure to 
prosecute their objections at the Continental Debtors' plan 
confirmation hearing. Rather, their claim preclusion 
argument is premised on the fact that Plaintiffs did not 
object to or appeal the Bankruptcy Court's order approving 
the Tripartite Settlement. This argument amounts to little 
more than sleight of hand. Hardly a clear barrier as urged 
by the Continental Debtors, the Tripartite Settlement 
resolves only claims between the Continental Debtors, their 
D&Os, and the D&O liability insurers, see, e.g., Supp. App. 
B36, B47, B60, and does not appear to affect Plaintiffs' 
claims at all. Although the Tripartite Settlement might have 
affected Plaintiffs' rights had their lawsuits been derivative,4 
the Continental Debtors do not argue on appeal that 
Plaintiffs' claims are derivative and we find nothing in the 
Tripartite Settlement to suggest that it implicated Plaintiffs' 
direct claims against the non-debtor D&O defendants. 
Thus, Plaintiffs' failure to object to or appeal from the 
Tripartite Settlement does not bar their appeal from the 
Bankruptcy Court's order confirming the Continental 
Debtors' plan of reorganization. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., In re Szoskek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1414 (3d Cir. 1989) (declining 
to reverse confirmation of chapter 13 plan when appellant failed to object 
to confirmation order). See also Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes and Gray, 
65 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) ("the issue of the bankruptcy court's 
power to enter its so-called `incidental' injunction was precluded, having 
been conclusively resolved in the confirmation order which Monarch Life 
neither opposed nor appealed. . . . The proper recourse for addressing 
these questions was by direct appeal from the order of confirmation"); 
Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1052-1054 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that Republic's cause of action for enforcement of the guaranty 
was barred by confirmation order that Republic did not appeal) (citing 
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 177 (1938) (holding that party may not 
collaterally attack the jurisdiction of a court when that question already 
has been decided)). 
 
4. One of Plaintiffs' class actions, the Gillman action, originally was 
filed 
as a derivative action, but that action was dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds and was re-filed in a different venue as a class action. 
 





We similarly reject the Continental Debtors' argument 
that we should dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal here for"equitable 
mootness" as we did in a previous appeal that arose out of 
the Continental Debtors' bankruptcy. See In re Continental 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Continental 1996"). 
Under the doctrine of equitable mootness, an appeal should 
be dismissed, even if the court has jurisdiction and could 
fashion relief, if the implementation of that relief would be 
inequitable. Id. at 559 [citations omitted]. Following the 
lead of other circuits, we noted in Continental 1996 that "[i]f 
limited in scope and cautiously applied, this doctrine 
provides a vehicle whereby the court can prevent 
substantial harm to numerous parties." Id. 
 
The appeals dismissed in Continental 1996 had an 
"integral nexus" with the feasibility of the Continental 
Debtors' plan of reorganization. See id. at 564. In that case, 
Collateral and Certificate Trustees were appealing orders of 
the Bankruptcy Court that denied the Trustees' motion for 
adequate protection, confirmed the Continental Debtors' 
plan of reorganization, and denied a motion for the 
establishment of a cash deposit of $123,479,287. Id. at 
555. We identified the prudential factors other courts have 
considered to evaluate equitable mootness, including 
whether the plan has been substantially consummated or 
stayed, whether the requested relief would affect the rights 
of other parties, whether the requested relief would affect 
the success of the plan, and the public policy of affording 
finality to bankruptcy judgments. Id. at 560. 
 
The Continental Debtors established a record in 
Continental 1996 that "an essential factor in that decision 
[of investors to rely on the confirmation order] was the 
bankruptcy court's disallowance of the Trustees' adequate 
protection claim." Id. at 562-563; see also id. at 564 (citing 
record establishing that investors would not close 
transaction if Trustees received requested relief). At the 
same time, we found: 
 
       The Trustees have not presented us with any 
       arguments which would weigh against all of the 
       prudential considerations that dictate that this 
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       consummated reorganization must be left in place. . . 
       To convince a court to take the action sought by the 
       Trustees which would undermine the basis for the 
       Investors' decision to proceed, the Trustees would have 
       to proffer a powerful reason indeed. They have not even 
       attempted to do so. 
 Id. at 566. Thus, we concluded in Continental 1996 that "we 
can see no prudential considerations that would support an 
attempt by an appellate court, district or court of appeals, 
to fashion even a limited remedy for the Trustees." Id. at 
567. Accordingly, we found that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when the Court dismissed the 
Continental 1996 appeals. Id. 
 
We face a very different situation in the instant appeal. 
We note that the Continental Debtors' brief to the District 
Court did not raise equitable mootness. The Continental 
Debtors later submitted a letter to the District Court 
enclosing another court decision that itself happens to 
mention equitable mootness among many other issues, see 
Third Supp. App. B2353 et seq., but the Continental 
Debtors' cover letter to the District Court does not bring 
this issue specifically to the District Court's attention. 
Thus, the Continental Debtors did not properly preserve the 
equitable mootness argument for appeal. Even if they had 
properly preserved the issue, however, the Continental 
Debtors established no record before the District Court, or 
before us, regarding the application of the equitable 
mootness doctrine to the particular facts and 
circumstances of Plaintiffs' appeal. Unlike their posturing of 
this issue in Continental 1996, they provide no evidence 
that investors and creditors, in deciding whether to support 
the Continental Debtors' plan, ever considered Plaintiffs' 
claims against the non-debtor D&Os in class actions worth 
a few million dollars, arguably a nominal amount given an 
airline reorganization of this magnitude.5  No evidence or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See, e.g., Third Supp. App. B1830 (disclosure statement listing assets 
and liabilities of Continental Debtors in amount exceeding $4.6 billion); 
Third Supp. App. B1701, 1702 (Continental Debtors' counsel describing 
$6.5 billion of enterprise value); Third Supp. App. B1703 (noting that 
plan would be feasible even with another $100 million of debt); Joint 
App. A381 (memorandum in support of plan confirmation stating that 
Debtors will emerge from bankruptcy with approximately $610 million of 
shareholder equity and approximately $550 million of cash). 
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arguments have been presented that Plaintiffs' appeal, if 
successful, would necessitate the reversal or unraveling of 
the entire plan of reorganization. Accord In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distinguishing 
the Second Circuit's equitable mootness decision arising 
from the Chateaugay bankruptcy and stating that"[i]t is 
difficult to conceive how a potential liability of, at most, 
several million dollars could unravel the Debtors' 
reorganization, which involved the transfer of billions of 
dollars, and which has resulted in the revival of Debtors 
into a multibillion dollar operation with $200 million in 
working capital . . . appellees have made no showing that 
it would `knock the props out from under the authorization 
for every transaction that has taken place and create an 
unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy 
Court.' ") (citing Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Steel Co., 10 F.3d 
944, 952 (2d Cir. 1993)). Apparently, the Continental 
Debtors have chosen to rest on the record established in 
Continental 1996. Yet, much of that record is entirely 
inapposite to the facts and circumstances of Plaintiffs' 
appeal. 
 
In balancing the policy favoring finality of bankruptcy 
court judgments -- particularly reorganization plans -- 
against other considerations, we note as well that the 
equities here would not dictate dismissal. Plaintiffs, who 
have never had their day in court, have been forced to 
forfeit their claims against non-debtors with no 
consideration in return. Even if successful, Plaintiffs' 
appeal should not threaten the entire reorganization. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs are not responsible for the extensive 
delay in this appeal; the District Court issued its opinion 
upholding the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order more 
than five years after Plaintiffs' appealed that confirmation 
order. 
 
We conclude that the key ingredients necessary for 
dismissal that led to our dismissal of Continental 1996 -- 
specific presentation of this issue to the Court below, an 
evidentiary record, and equitable considerations-- are 
lacking here. Consequently, we will examine the merits of 
this appeal. 
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Validity of non-debtor release and permanent injunction 
 
At issue in this appeal is a provision releasing and 
permanently enjoining Plaintiffs' actions against the 
Continental Debtors' D&Os who have not formally availed 
themselves of the benefits and burdens of the bankruptcy 
process. Plaintiffs argue that section 12.4(b)(ii) of the 
Continental Debtors' plan impermissibly releases and 
permanently enjoins their class actions against non-debtors 
without notice to individual class members and without 
consent or consideration, violating 11 U.S.C. S 524(e) by 
relieving non-debtor parties of liabilities. Although Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that 11 U.S.C. S 105(a) has been used by 
some courts to enjoin actions against non-debtors when 
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court 
orders, Plaintiffs question the legal and factual basis for the 
District Court's finding of need and propriety in this 
particular instance. 
 
Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that 
the bankruptcy discharge of a debtor, by itself, does not 
operate to relieve non-debtors of their liabilities. See Copelin 
v. Spirco, Inc., 182 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing First 
Fidelity Bank v. McAteer, 985 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the 
release and permanent injunction of claims against non- 
debtors, except in one instance not applicable here. 6 
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supplements courts' 
specifically enumerated bankruptcy powers by authorizing 
orders necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code. However, section 105(a) has a limited 
scope. It does not "create substantive rights that would 
otherwise be unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code." 
United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 
1992). Accord Internal Revenue Service v. Kaplan , 104 F.3d 
589, 597 (3d Cir. 1997). See generally Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (court's 
equitable powers "must and can only be exercised within 
the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See 11 U.S.C. S 524(g) (establishing procedure for resolving asbestos 
claims). 
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We have not ruled previously on the validity of provisions 
in chapter 11 plans of reorganization releasing and 
permanently enjoining third party actions against non- 
debtors.7 We will review briefly the relevant decisions from 
other circuits, leading us to the inescapable conclusion 
that, in this appeal, the release and permanent injunction 
of Plaintiffs' lawsuits are legally and factually 
insupportable. 
 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
have held that non-debtor releases and permanent 
injunctions are impermissible. "The bankruptcy court has 
no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor 
pursuant to the consent of creditors as part of a 
reorganization plan." Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 
1432 (9th Cir. 1985). "Section 524(e) precludes discharging 
the liabilities of nondebtors." Resorts Internat'l v. 
Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's decision vacating global 
release provision). These courts find a release and 
permanent injunction to be indistinguishable from a 
bankruptcy discharge. See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. 
Deutche Credit Corp., 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989). 
See also Landsing Diversified Properties - II v. First Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re Western Real Estate Fund, 
Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir. 1990) (vacating 
injunction, following American Hardwoods with respect to 
permanent injunctions of claims against non-debtor), 
modified by Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our decision in McAteer occasionally is cited for the proposition that 
the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the release of obligations of non- 
debtor parties, but McAteer, a chapter 13 case with a unique set of facts, 
does not address the validity of a specific provision in a chapter 11 plan 
of reorganization that permanently enjoins actions against non-debtor 
parties. See McAteer, 985 F.2d at 118. 
 
8. Quite a few courts have followed the lead of the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits. See, e.g., In re Davis Broadcasting, Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 292 
(M.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that non-debtor injunction violated section 
524(e) and thus exceeded power and authority of bankruptcy court, even 
though Plaintiffs did not take any action to have non-debtor injunction 
removed from plan); Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re 
A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 764 (D. Utah 1985) (deleting provisions 
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Other circuits have adopted a more flexible approach, 
albeit in the context of extraordinary cases. In Drexel and 
Manville, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
upheld plans of reorganization containing releases and 
permanent injunctions of widespread claims against co- 
liable parties, but those plans also provided consideration 
to parties who would be enjoined from suing non-debtors. 
See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992); Kane v. Johns- 
Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 
640, 649 (2d Cir. 1988). In Robins, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit likewise upheld non-debtor releases that 
were necessary to reorganization and were accompanied by 
consideration for mass tort claimants, provided in part by 
the non-debtors. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. 
Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989). A central 
focus of these three reorganizations was the global 
settlement of massive liabilities against the debtors and co- 
liable parties. Substantial financial contributions from non- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of confirmed plan that shield non-debtor party from liability); In re 
Future 
Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("clear weight of 
decisional authority supports the proposition that Chapter 11 plans 
which call for the release of nonparties (such as guarantors) from 
liability upon obligations of the debtor are violative of S 524(e)"); In 
re 
 L.B.G. Properties, Inc., 72 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding 
that section 524(e) prohibits plan provision releasing two non-debtor 
guarantors); In re Scranes, Inc., 67 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1986) (holding that provision in confirmed plan of reorganization does 
not release the liabilities of a non-debtor guarantor); In re Bennett 
Paper 
 
Corp., 68 B.R. 518, 520 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) (disapproving disclosure 
statement for failure to inform creditors that non-debtor release 
provision is impermissible); In re Eller Bros., Inc., 53 B.R. 10, 12 
(Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 1985) (denying confirmation because forcing FDIC to release 
non-debtor guarantors violates section 524(e)). Accord In re Keller, 157 
B.R. 680, 686 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993) (refusing to confirm plan 
compelling creditor to release liens against property of non-debtor, which 
violates section 1129(a)(1) just like provisions that release claims 
against 
non-debtors). See also In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 14 (Bankr. 
N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that court has neither jurisdiction nor 
affirmative substantive authority under Bankruptcy Code to release 
obligations of non-debtors). 
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debtor co-liable parties provided compensation to claimants 
in exchange for the release of their liabilities and made 
these reorganizations feasible.9 
 
In AOV, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found 
that a plan provision releasing the liabilities of non-debtors 
was unfair because the plan did not provide additional 
compensation to a creditor whose claim against non-debtor 
was being released, see In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 
1140, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1986), thus indicating that it is 
necessary to provide adequate consideration to a 
claimholder being forced to release claims against non- 
debtors. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
have addressed the issue of non-debtor releases in the 
context of settlement agreements. In Zale, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the approval of a settlement among a debtor, the 
debtor's D&Os, and the creditors' committee that 
permanently enjoined a variety of existing and potential 
claims against the settling defendants on the ground that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Courts generally have not construed the more permissive view of the 
Second and Fourth Circuits to give them "unfettered discretion to 
discharge non-debtors from liability." Chateaugay, 167 B.R. at 780 
(noting that bankruptcy courts have permanently enjoined future 
lawsuits against non-debtors only when essential to plan confirmation). 
Some courts presiding over cases with less "unusual" facts have been 
reluctant to expand the holdings of these cases. E.g., In re Market Square 
Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (in finding non- 
debtor release impermissible, distinguishing cases with in which 
feasibility of reorganization hinges on resolution of massive claims). As 
a 
 
result, according to one Bankruptcy Court, "few cases have actually 
allowed or upheld non-consensual permanent injunctions without 
pointing to some other Bankruptcy Code provision or authorization 
under state law. . . . Many cases which are cited for the proposition that 
the bankruptcy court may issue permanent injunctions were, in fact, 
decided on other grounds." In re Sybaris Clubs Internat'l, Inc., 189 B.R. 
152, 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). See generally In re Master Mortgage 
Investment Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 937 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) 
(explaining that a permanent injunction limiting the liability of non- 
debtor parties is "a rare thing" that should not be considered absent "a 
showing of exceptional circumstances" in which several key factors are 
present). Accord Greenblatt v. Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc. (In re 
Richard 
 
Potasky Jeweler, Inc.), 222 B.R. 816, 826-828 (S.D. Ohio 1998). 
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the injunction impermissibly discharged non-debtor 
liabilities. See Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 
746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995). In reaching this decision, the 
Court distinguished Drexel and Manville by explaining that 
"in those cases, however, the courts upheld permanent 
injunctions of third party claims because while the 
injunction permanently enjoined the lawsuits, it also 
channeled those claims to allow recovery from separate 
assets and thereby avoided discharging the nondebtor. . . . 
The injunction at issue in this case provided no alternative 
means for Feld and NUFIC to recover from CIGNA for their 
offensive contract rights." Id. at 760-761. In Munford, 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling 
that 11 U.S.C. S 105 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 authorized a 
bankruptcy court to permanently enjoin nonsettling 
defendants from asserting contribution and indemnification 
claims against a defendant consulting firm when the 
permanent injunction was integral to the debtor's 
settlement with the consulting firm and the bar order was 
fair and equitable. See Matter of Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 
455 (11th Cir. 1996).10 
 
Plaintiffs do not ask us to establish a blanket rule 
prohibiting all non-consensual releases and permanent 
injunctions of non-debtor obligations. Given the manner in 
which the issue has been presented to us, we need not 
establish our own rule regarding the conditions under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 10. Interestingly, several courts of appeals have refused to overturn non- 
debtor releases and permanent injunctions based on grounds other than 
the merits. In two of these cases, parties collaterally attacked the 
confirmation orders instead of appealing them directly. See Monarch Life 
Ins. Co., 65 F.3d at 983; Shoaf, 815 F.2d at 1052-1053 (citing Stoll v. 
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. at 177). In the oft-cited Specialty Equipment decision, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that consensual releases, at the very least, do 
not run afoul of 11 U.S.C. S 524(e), but the appeal was dismissed as 
moot and not on the merits. See In re Specialty Equipment Co., 3 F.3d 
1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1993). This dicta in Specialty Equipment 
nonetheless has called into question the vitality of an earlier Seventh 
Circuit decision interpreting the precursor to section 524(e), section 16 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898, and concluding that the statute 
specifically prohibited the discharge of non-debtor guarantors, regardless 
of a provision in a plan of reorganization. See Union Carbide Corp. v. 
Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
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which non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions are 
appropriate or permissible. Establishing a rule would 
provide guidance prospectively, but would be ill-advised 
when we can rule on Plaintiffs' appeal without doing so.11 
Considering the instant appeal in the context of the case 
law we have reviewed, we conclude that the provision in the 
Continental Debtors' plan releasing and permanently 
enjoining Plaintiffs' lawsuits against the non-debtor D&O 
defendants does not pass muster under even the most 
flexible tests for the validity of non-debtor releases. The 
hallmarks of permissible non-consensual releases-- 
fairness, necessity to the reorganization, and specific 





The Bankruptcy Court never specifically addressed the 
release and permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Thus, the order confirming the Continental Debtors' plan of 
reorganization and releasing and permanently enjoining 
Plaintiffs' claims was not accompanied by any findings that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Several of the Bankruptcy Courts in our Circuit have stated that 
non-debtor releases are permissible only if consensual, at least with 
respect to direct (as opposed to derivative) claims. See, e.g., In re 
Zenith 
Electronics Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (holding that 
releases of non-derivative third-party claims against non-debtor "cannot 
be accomplished without the affirmative agreement of the creditor 
affected"); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506-507 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1997) ("Where the creditor consents to the release, and 
presumably receives consideration in exchange for that agreement, it has 
not been forced by virtue of the discharge provisions of the code. . . 
[A]s 
 
the settlements arise by agreement and not by operation of law, they do 
not run afoul of section 524(e)"); In re West Coast Video Enterprises, 
Inc., 
174 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to enforce releases 
with respect to movants who did not vote on plan because "each creditor 
bound by the terms of the [non-debtor] release must individually affirm 
same, either with a vote in favor of a plan including such a provision, or 
otherwise"). None of these cases, of course, involved the mass litigation 
found in Robins, Manville, or Drexel. Because the release and permanent 
injunction of Plaintiffs' claims are so clearly invalid under any 
standard, 
 
we need not speculate on whether there are circumstances under which 
we might validate a non-consensual release that is both necessary and 
given in exchange for fair consideration. 
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the release was fair to the Plaintiffs and necessary to the 
Continental Debtors' reorganization.12  Without such 
findings, a release and permanent injunction cannot stand 
on their merits under any of the standards set forth in the 




In attempting to salvage the release and permanent 
injunction of Plaintiffs' claims, the District Court did not 
discuss the lack of findings of the Bankruptcy Court, but 
instead made its own findings. As previously mentioned, 
the District Court cited section 105(a) as a basis for 
upholding the validity of non-consensual releases and 
permanent injunctions that are essential to plan 
confirmation. The District Court required, but could not 
find, "compelling reasons" to disturb the Continental 
Debtors' plan based on the Plaintiffs' objections, 
particularly because the Plaintiffs did not object to or 
appeal the Tripartite Settlement. The District Court also 
considered the release and permanent injunction of 
Plaintiffs' claims to be a "key element" of the Continental 
Debtors' reorganization because the Continental Debtors 
were obliged to indemnify the D&Os and thus would 
ultimately bear the burden of Plaintiffs' lawsuits. The 
District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' actions against 
the non-debtor D&O defendants implicated the Continental 
Debtors' D&O liability insurance policy, and thus affected 
property of the Continental Debtors' bankruptcy estate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We also note, with some concern, that the Bankruptcy Court 
apparently never examined its jurisdiction to release and permanently 
enjoin Plaintiffs' claims against non-debtors. Although bankruptcy 
subject matter jurisdiction can extend to matters between non-debtor 
third parties affecting the debtor or the bankruptcy case, see 28 U.S.C. 
S 1334; Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n. 5 (1995), a court 
cannot simply presume it has jurisdiction in a bankruptcy case to 
permanently enjoin third-party class actions against non-debtors. We 
must remain mindful that bankruptcy jurisdiction is limited, as is the 
explicit grant of authority to bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. SS 157, 
1334; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50 (1982). We do not treat this very significant issue more fully, 
however, 
 
because the record does not permit us to resolve this issue and the 
parties have not raised and discussed it in their appellate briefs. 
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In making these findings, the District Court assumed 
facts not of record and drew superficial analogies based on 
inapposite case law. Contrary to the conclusion of the 
District Court and the arguments of the Continental 
Debtors, Manville, Robins, and Drexel do not support the 
validity of the release and permanent injunction of 
Plaintiffs' claims based on the record before us. First, 
unlike the courts in these cases, the District Court did not 
discuss whether the release and permanent injunction were 
fair to Plaintiffs and were given in exchange for reasonable 
consideration. Indeed, the Continental Debtors have not 
disputed Plaintiffs' contention that Plaintiffs received no 
consideration in exchange for having their lawsuits 
permanently enjoined.13 On this basis alone, Manville, 
Drexel, and Robins are inapplicable. 
 
With respect to the District Court's view of the necessity 
of the release and permanent injunction, we find nothing in 
the record to even imply that the success of the Continental 
Debtors' reorganization bore any relationship to the release 
and permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' class actions. Unlike 
in cases such as Manville, Drexel, and Robins, we have 
found no evidence that the non-debtor D&Os provided a 
critical financial contribution to the Continental Debtors' 
plan that was necessary to make the plan feasible in 
exchange for receiving a release of liability for Plaintiffs' 
claims. Nor did Plaintiffs' lawsuits themselves propel the 
Continental Debtors into bankruptcy;14  far from being the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Some, but not all, of the Plaintiffs who were included in the proof of 
claim filed in the Continental Holdings case may have received five cents 
on the dollar. See Addendum to Supp. App. However, this distribution 
was on behalf of their "creditor" status with respect to Continental 
Airlines Holdings, not in exchange for the release of their claims against 
non-debtors. 
 
14. According to the Continental Debtors' disclosure statement 
describing their plan of reorganization, their bankruptcy was precipitated 
by a recession and changes in fuel costs and flight demand, leaving the 
Continental Debtors with "a fourth quarter 1990 operating loss of 
approximately $300 million, no access to capital markets and only $87 
million in cash." Third Supp. App. B1844 - B1845. See also Third Supp. 
App. B2042 (describing other precipitating factors, such as heavy losses 
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tail wagging the dog, we find it difficult to conceive that 
Plaintiffs' lawsuits were anything more than a flea. 
 
We also take issue with the District Court's unsupported 
conclusion that the Continental Debtors' obligation to 
indemnify its D&Os transforms the release and permanent 
injunction of Plaintiffs' claims against non-debtor D&O 
defendants into a "key element" of the Continental Debtors' 
reorganization.15 We have stated previously that federal 
courts disfavor indemnity for federal securities law 
violations, calling into question the enforceability of these 
obligations. See Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 484- 
486 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in extinguishing indemnification claims 
running counter to policies underlying securities laws). See 
also Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 
637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding district 
court's dismissal of indemnity claim, which "would 
undermine the statutory purpose of assuring diligent 
performance of duty and deterring negligence"); Globus v. 
Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 
1969) (agreeing with the lower court that "to tolerate 
indemnity under these circumstances would encourage 
flouting the policy of the common law and the securities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Continental Debtors elected to retain their contractual 
obligation, under bylaws and "assumed" employment contracts, see 11 
U.S.C. S 365(a), to indemnify their officers and directors. The 
Continental 
 
Debtors' by-laws specifically provide only for director and officer 
indemnification "to the fullest extent permitted by applicable statute." 
Joint Supp. App. B2; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 S 145. Delaware law permits 
indemnification of corporate directors and officers for liability if they 
acted "in good faith and in a manner which the person reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation." 
 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 S 145(a). The statutory obligation to reimburse for 
actual and reasonable defense costs arises if the director or officer was 
"successful on the merits or otherwise in defense" of an action, and 
advancement of expenses is not required. Id.S 145(c); see Advanced 
Mining Systems v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. Ch. 1992) (absent by-law 
provisions establishing mandatory advancement, requiring that board 
consider corporation's interests before providing such advancement); 
Havens v. Attar, No. 15134, 1997 WL 55957 at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 
1997) (granting preliminary injunction to prevent board from advancing 
litigation expenses). 
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act"); Lucas v. Hackett Assoc., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 531, 
535-538 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that party was not 
entitled to indemnity for federal securities law violations, 
including those "clothed as state law tort claims," but 
declining to enter an order barring a state court from 
proceeding on an indemnity claim premised solely on state 
law) (citing In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 
at 1306, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992)); Raychem Corp. v. Fed. Ins. 
Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Federal 
courts have held that those held liable for violations of 
certain provisions of the federal securities laws, including 
the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act, may not recover 
indemnification"); Greenwald v. American Medcare Corp., 
666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interpreting 
Delaware law, stating that "no party who has himself 
knowingly and wilfully violated the federal securities laws 
may obtain indemnity from another violator of those laws," 
but finding that party should have opportunity to show 
whether he was at fault). 
 
We find no evidence in the record before us supporting 
the possibility or probability of D&O indemnification as a 
factual or legal matter. Even if the D&O defendants' 
obligations culminating from Plaintiffs' class actions were 
indemnifiable, the fact that the reorganized Continental 
Airlines might face an indemnity claim sometime in the 
future, in some unspecified amount, does not make the 
release and permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' claims 
"necessary" to ensure the success of the Continental 
Debtors' reorganization. 
 
Similarly unsupported is the District Court's conclusion 
that the non-debtor release and permanent injunction were 
warranted because Plaintiffs' lawsuits ultimately might 
implicate the D&O liability insurance policy, which was 
property of the Continental Debtors' bankruptcy estate 
under 11 U.S.C. S 541(a). One cannot assume too quickly 
that the proceeds of this policy are property of the estate 
when the non-debtor D&Os, not the Continental Debtors, 
are the direct beneficiaries of the policy. We previously have 
recognized, albeit in a different context, that the proceeds 
from a insurance policy should be evaluated separately 
from the debtor's interest in the policy itself. See McAteer, 
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985 F.2d at 117 (stating in a chapter 13 case that 
"[o]wnership of a life insurance policy, such as involved 
here, does not necessarily entail ownership of the proceeds 
of that policy"). Other courts of appeals have disagreed as 
to the circumstances under which the proceeds of a D&O 
policy can be considered property of the estate, 16 but the 
analysis has been fact-intensive in any event. Such an 
analysis never took place in the District Court or the 
Bankruptcy Court. Even assuming that the proceeds are 
property of the estate, this by itself does not justify a 
permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' actions against the 
insured non-debtor D&O defendants as necessary for the 
reorganization of the Continental Debtors. 
 
We do not dispute that, some day in the future, the 
reorganized Continental Debtors may face litigation or 
experience some financial ramification based on liabilities of 
the D&Os as a result of the indemnity obligation or the 
D&O liability insurance policy. However, we cannot accept 
the District Court's conclusion that a purported"identity of 
interest" between the Continental Debtors and the non- 
debtor D&O defendants, forged by the indemnity obligation 
or the D&O liability insurance policy, established the 
necessity of releasing and permanently enjoining Plaintiffs' 
claims, nor does this identity of interest speak to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Compare In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1401 
(5th Cir. 1987) (engaging in fact-specific analysis and finding that 
corporate debtor had no ownership interest in proceeds of D&O liability 
policy, which belonged to the D&Os) with Minoco Group of Companies, 
Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency (In re Minoco Group of Companies, 
Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986) (Noting that "the estate is worth 
more with the policy than without the policy,"finding that D&O 
indemnity policy protected debtor against indemnity claims and was 
property of corporation's bankruptcy estate, thus insurer was stayed 
from terminating policy); Pintlar Corp. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of 
New 
 
York, 124 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Minoco, 
concluding that court could not enjoin insurers' state court action for 
declaratory relief that would threaten only liability portion of D&O 
coverage). See also First Central Financial Corp. v. Lipson (In re First 
Central Financial Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("While 
a majority of courts consider a D&O policy estate property [citations 
omitted], there is an increasing view that a distinction should be drawn 
when considering treatment of proceeds under such policies"). 
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fairness of the release and permanent injunction that we 
construe cases such as Manville, Drexel, or Robins to 
require.17 We conclude that granting permanent injunctions 
to protect non-debtor parties on the basis of theoretical 
identity of interest alone would turn bankruptcy principles 
on their head. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code can be 
construed to establish such extraordinary protection for 
non-debtor parties. 
 
In summary, we find, based on the record before us, that 
the Bankruptcy Court and District Court lacked a sufficient 
evidentiary and legal basis to authorize the release and 
permanent injunction of Plaintiffs' claims under any of the 
standards adopted by courts that have evaluated non- 
debtor releases and permanent injunctions. Under these 
circumstances, the release and permanent injunction 
amounted to nothing more than a lockstep discharge of 





For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court's 
order. Based on our determination that the provision 
releasing and permanently enjoining Plaintiffs' claims is 
legally insupportable, we need not reach two remaining 
issues raised by Plaintiffs relating to Due Process and 
violation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Cases cited by the Continental Debtors to support their argument 
that identity of interest justifies a permanent injunction, see Brief for 
Appellees at 30, actually involve the entry of a temporary injunction or 
extension of the automatic stay during the pendency of a bankruptcy 
case, which is quite a different matter. Although some courts may 
consider identity of interest when deciding whether to grant a permanent 
injunction, that factor is not considered in a vacuum; rather, it must be 
supported by actual record facts in evidence, and accompanied by other 
key considerations, e.g., whether the non-debtors made substantial 
contributions to the reorganization, whether the injunction is essential 
to 
 
reorganization, whether affected parties overwhelmingly have agreed to 
accept the proposed treatment, and whether the plan pays all or 
substantially all of the affected parties' claims. See Master Mortgage 
Inv. 
 
Fund, 168 B.R. at 935. 
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